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 strategy representation


Learning Strategy Representation for Imitation Learning in Multi-Agent Games

Lei, Shiqi, Lee, Kanghon, Li, Linjing, Park, Jinkyoo

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The offline datasets for imitation learning (IL) in multi-agent games typically contain player trajectories exhibiting diverse strategies, which necessitate measures to prevent learning algorithms from acquiring undesirable behaviors. Learning representations for these trajectories is an effective approach to depicting the strategies employed by each demonstrator. However, existing learning strategies often require player identification or rely on strong assumptions, which are not appropriate for multi-agent games. Therefore, in this paper, we introduce the Strategy Representation for Imitation Learning (STRIL) framework, which (1) effectively learns strategy representations in multi-agent games, (2) estimates proposed indicators based on these representations, and (3) filters out sub-optimal data using the indicators. STRIL is a plug-in method that can be integrated into existing IL algorithms. We demonstrate the effectiveness of STRIL across competitive multi-agent scenarios, including Two-player Pong, Limit Texas Hold'em, and Connect Four. Our approach successfully acquires strategy representations and indicators, thereby identifying dominant trajectories and significantly enhancing existing IL performance across these environments.


ELA: Exploited Level Augmentation for Offline Learning in Zero-Sum Games

Lei, Shiqi, Lee, Kanghoon, Li, Linjing, Park, Jinkyoo, Li, Jiachen

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Offline learning has become widely used due to its ability to derive effective policies from offline datasets gathered by expert demonstrators without interacting with the environment directly. Recent research has explored various ways to enhance offline learning efficiency by considering the characteristics (e.g., expertise level or multiple demonstrators) of the dataset. However, a different approach is necessary in the context of zero-sum games, where outcomes vary significantly based on the strategy of the opponent. In this study, we introduce a novel approach that uses unsupervised learning techniques to estimate the exploited level of each trajectory from the offline dataset of zero-sum games made by diverse demonstrators. Subsequently, we incorporate the estimated exploited level into the offline learning to maximize the influence of the dominant strategy. Our method enables interpretable exploited level estimation in multiple zero-sum games and effectively identifies dominant strategy data. Also, our exploited level augmented offline learning significantly enhances the original offline learning algorithms including imitation learning and offline reinforcement learning for zero-sum games.


CFR-MIX: Solving Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games with Combinatorial Action Space

Li, Shuxin, Zhang, Youzhi, Wang, Xinrun, Xue, Wanqi, An, Bo

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which results in the inefficiency of the existing algorithms, e.g., Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR). To address this problem, we propose a new framework of CFR: CFR-MIX. Firstly, we propose a new strategy representation that represents a joint action strategy using individual strategies of all agents and a consistency relationship to maintain the cooperation between agents. To compute the equilibrium with individual strategies under the CFR framework, we transform the consistency relationship between strategies to the consistency relationship between the cumulative regret values. Furthermore, we propose a novel decomposition method over cumulative regret values to guarantee the consistency relationship between the cumulative regret values. Finally, we introduce our new algorithm CFR-MIX which employs a mixing layer to estimate cumulative regret values of joint actions as a non-linear combination of cumulative regret values of individual actions. Experimental results show that CFR-MIX outperforms existing algorithms on various games significantly.


Computing Strong Game-Theoretic Strategies in Jotto

Ganzfried, Sam

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

We develop a new approach that computes approximate equilibrium strategies in Jotto, a popular word game. Jotto is an extremely large two-player game of imperfect information; its game tree has many orders of magnitude more states than games previously studied, including no-limit Texas hold 'em. To address the fact that the game is so large, we propose a novel strategy representation called oracular form, in which we do not explicitly represent a strategy, but rather appeal to an oracle that quickly outputs a sample move from the strategy's distribution. Our overall approach is based on an extension of the fictitious play algorithm to this oracular setting. We demonstrate the superiority of our computed strategies over the strategies computed by a benchmark algorithm, both in terms of head-to-head and worst-case performance.